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ESSAY

WHAT THE RETURN OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES MEANS FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Paul R. Verkuil*
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law, writ large, is about the way agencies behave, and
how other institutions and the public react to that behavior. By promulgating rules, adjudicating cases and claims, enforcing statutes, providing
guidance, collaborating with interest groups, exercising discretion, and so
forth, agencies manage and implement the business of government.1 They
do this under the auspices of the Executive Branch, but the other branches
assert authority over the agencies as well. Congress does so by legislating,
budgeting, and overseeing, while the courts do so by interpreting statutes
and requiring rational behavior from agencies. These important and essential activities fill many law school publications with statutes, cases, and
rules. But the branches that produce this body of law are institutionally
constrained—they have difficulty testing hypotheses or experimenting with
alternatives before statutes are enacted, cases are decided, or rules are
promulgated.
Congress and the courts often act in a data vacuum. True, Congress
holds hearings and requests reports from the Government Accountability
Office or the Congressional Research Service—but legislation often results
2
from extraordinary events rather than from systematic study. When the
courts use the common law process of incremental decision making, they can
*
Tenth Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS);
President Emeritus, The College of William & Mary. Thanks to Reeve Bull, Jeff Lubbers,
Michael McCarthy, David Pritzker, Scott Rafferty, and Jon Siegel for their assistance and
advice on this Essay.
1.
See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1386–90 (2004) (describing the menu of policy-making tools available to federal agencies).
2.
Congress, as the institution closest to the electorate, often responds to dramatic
events rather than systematic studies. Indeed, statutes sometimes bear the name of their
precipitating cause (e.g., The Lindbergh Law, The Brady Law, etc.). See Ethan Trex, 11 Laws
Named After People, MENTAL FLOSS (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:43 PM), http://www.
mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/43307.
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sharpen insights over time, but that process has now been overwhelmed
3
4
by statutory law. Courts are institutionally unsuited to be experimenters.
The Executive Branch can review most agency regulatory agendas and rules
through the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). However, OIRA has limited
5
ability and time to try out alternatives or conduct empirical studies. The
agencies have greater capacity in this regard—guidance can precede rules,
for example—but they are also under pressure to act, not theorize, due to
statutory deadlines, oversight hearings, and budget and personnel ceilings.
The rulemaking process gives agencies the ability to learn before doing, but,
too often, agencies begin with their positions staked out and their minds
6
made up. On matters of procedure and process, there may be even less
time available, despite the fact that experimentation and cross-agency comparisons could greatly improve agency performance.
This is where ACUS comes in. The Conference studies the “efficiency,
adequacy and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administra7
tive agencies in carrying out administrative programs.” The Conference
3.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-2 (1982)
(recognizing that the courts are “choking on statutes” and advocating a common law approach to their revision and updating).
4.
For due process reasons, trial courts are limited by record requirements and
relevancy standards, except for a limited judicial notice capacity. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201,
401. Appellate courts are bound by the record below, except for amicus briefs, which can
offer broader context. The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction and a legal policymaking role, but it lacks the institutional resources to find facts. In original jurisdiction
cases, for example, facts are determined by special masters. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
5.
OIRA is a small shop with a big job; it reviews hundreds of agency regulations
annually. Its capacity to experiment or “game” alternatives is very limited. OMB’s Office of
Performance and Personnel Management conducts some empirically-based government
initiatives, like employee surveys, but cannot do much experimental work either.
6.
Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492, 1494-95
(1992) (comparing rulemaking processes to Kabuki theater in that they create the illusion of
an exchange of views). One of the promises of e-rulemaking, the process of issuing notices
and receiving comments over the Internet, is that it can open up the process at an earlier
stage to facilitate greater agency interaction with the public. ACUS has a project underway
to address this possibility. Agency Innovations in e-Rulemaking, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/
research/the-conference-current-projects/e-rulemaking-study-of-agency-innovations/ (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011).
7.
5 U.S.C. § 594 (2006). ACUS’s mandate is wisely limited to procedural matters,
where bipartisan agreement is more likely to be found. Even those substantively opposed to
the role of government in society can agree on the more neutral questions of process.
Indeed, procedure encompasses principles of universal appeal. The philosopher Stuart
Hampshire believes “fairness in procedures for resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of
fairness . . . fairness in procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature.”
STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 4 (2000). Of course, even procedure can have a
political dimension. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative
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can be viewed as the government’s “laboratory” for administrative process
and procedure. ACUS does not perform controlled experiments like the
8
National Institutes of Health (NIH) does; it conducts applied research by
using empirically-based analyses to understand the way the administrative
process works. It then transfers those insights to the agencies for action and
follows up with agencies to ensure compliance with its recommendations.
This implementation phase is also empirically-driven.
For the Conference, agencies themselves are the laboratories. It views
agencies not unlike how Justice Brandeis viewed states in the federal sys9
tem. Agency experimentation can lead to process systemization through
the identification and expansion of best practices. Systemization has been
part of ACUS’s mission from its inception. In 1960, Dean James Landis
advised President John F. Kennedy to create ACUS with these words: “The
concept of an Administrative Conference of the United States promises
more to the improvement of administrative procedures and practices and to
the systematization of the federal regulatory agencies than anything pres10
ently on the horizon.”
When the Conference engages an expert consultant for a study, it connects the analytical world of academic research to the real world of
administration. This has benefits for both sides. For the academy, Conference work helps address the longstanding criticism of legal scholarship’s
11
lack of empiricism. There is an increasing awareness of the value of

Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 268–78 (1978) (describing the procedural conflicts
behind the enactment of the APA).
8.
See, e.g., Michael S. Lauer & Francis S. Collins, Using Science to Improve the Nation’s Health System: NIH’s Commitment to Comparative Effectiveness Research, 303 JAMA 2182
(2010) (describing how comparative effectiveness research drives scientific research at NIH).
9.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the Federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Of course, ACUS looks to agencies for
innovative procedural ideas, rather than social and economic experiments, but it similarly
believes that agency experimentation, even if unsuccessful, can create important lessons for
other agencies.
10.
JAMES LANDIS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT 74 (1960). President Kennedy
established a temporary ACUS with Exec. Order No. 10,934, 3 C.F.R. 102 (1962). It was
permanently established by statute in 1964 by President Johnson. Administrative Conference
Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596
(2006)).
11.
The primary data set for legal researchers has long been the case law and statutes
produced at the federal and state levels. Study of these data was defined by Christopher
Columbus Langdell as a kind of scientific method. The legal realists challenged this vision
of law in the 1930s by questioning the assumptions and motives of judges and legislators.
Today, the legal realist inquiry itself has become empirically-based. See Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
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12

empiricism in law. Indeed, even the never-ending stream of articles on the
13
Chevron doctrine has begun to shift in this direction. In general, however,
studies of what agencies actually do still remain in short supply.
This was not always true. Some of the best descriptions of what agencies do were produced in the 1940s when the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) emerged. A highlight was Walter Gellhorn’s empirical studies of
agencies for the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Proce14
dure. It is notable that Professor Gellhorn, a “founding father” of
15
ACUS, continued to demand evidence-based reports from its consultants
in his long tenure on the Council of the Administrative Conference, a fact
to which I can personally attest. Even before Gellhorn, scholars like Ernst
Freund had urged the study of “internal” administrative law—what agencies
16
do rather than what the courts do to them. These earlier efforts underscore Dean Landis’s notion that ACUS can, through empirical research on
administrative law and process, systematize agency best practices.
The Conference also adds value for agency officials. By engaging highly focused and overworked bureaucrats with the world of scholarly analysis,
ACUS facilitates an exchange of views that enhances the quality of administrative management. Agency officials welcome advice on how to improve
their procedures and practices, and thoughtful critiques from ACUS are
12.
The growing interest in empirical studies has produced a peer-reviewed publication,
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. See Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEYBLACKWELL, http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=1740-1453 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
Outstanding empirical work has been done in administrative law.
13.
See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006); Peter H. Schuck &
E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law,
1990 DUKE L. J. 984.
14.
Professor Walter Gellhorn, as Staff Director of the Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure, produced twenty-seven monographs detailing the processes
and functions of individual agencies. See ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 7710 (1st Sess. 1941); ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 76-186 (3d Sess. 1940).
15.
Professor Gellhorn was appointed by President Kennedy to the Council of the
Temporary Administrative Conference. He subsequently served on the Council of ACUS
until his death in 1995. He was the only Council member granted, in effect, lifetime status.
See Peter Strauss, A Memorial to Walter Gelhorn [sic], AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/news/vol21no3/gelhorn.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
16.
See ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at v (2d ed. 1928) (stating
that “administrative law continues to be treated as law controlling the administration, and
not as law produced by the administration”). See generally Verkuil, supra note 7, at 266-67. For
a valuable contribution that refocuses scholarship on what agencies do, see Sidney A.
Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (2010).
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well received. This does not mean, of course, that these officials simply
accept the views of the Conference or its consultants. They fight hard for
their positions, as our lively committee meetings amply demonstrate. In the
end, reasoned recommendations based on facts make agency operations
more efficient, effective, and fair—values that are touchstones of the ACUS
mission.

I. HOW ACUS WORKS
ACUS is institutionally empowered to study what agencies do. It col17
lects “information and statistics” from agencies, and agency compliance
with requests for data or interviews is the norm. The agencies view the
Conference as a collaborator, not an overseer. This collegiality usually leads
to cooperative undertakings, sometimes requested and funded by the agencies themselves.
Our 101 members comprise the Chairman, ten additional Council
members appointed by the President (usually five from the government and
five from the public), and ninety other members (fifty senior government
officials and forty private citizens designated as “public members”).18 Notably, the current public members include individuals who have served in
every presidential administration since that of Lyndon B. Johnson. The
public members are selected on a bipartisan political basis, which ensures
that the Conference’s work is as balanced as possible in an era of partisan
division.
When the Conference convenes in plenary session twice a year to debate proposed recommendations, it is known as the Assembly.19 The fifty
government members represent over 200 agencies or sub-agencies.20 When
liaison representatives and Senior Fellows are added in, the resulting forum
is deeply diverse politically, intellectually, and experientially. This remarkable

17.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591, 594 (2006). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-154, at 3–4
(2011) (documenting the importance of ACUS’s mission to regulatory reform).
18.
See ACUS, GUIDE FOR MEMBERS 3–4 (2011), available at http://www.
acus.gov/about. The public members are practicing attorneys, scholars of administrative law
or government, and others “specially informed by knowledge and experience” in administrative procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 593 (2006).
19.
See 5 U.S.C. § 595 (2006).
20.
See Government Members, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/about/the-assembly/
government-members/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). Many of our members are general counsels or chiefs of staff of executive departments, each of which have numerous sub-agencies
under them. All of the departments are designated as members by the President, and the
independent agencies are statutory members. Two hundred and eleven agencies are “represented” by ACUS in this manner.
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Assembly, called a “public-private partnership” by President Obama,21 exists
nowhere else and costs the government virtually nothing.22
Ideas for projects are generated from a variety of sources, including rel23
evant committees on the Hill, organizations like the American Bar
24
25
Association, and the Conference members themselves. The Conference
staff creates project proposals that are approved by the Chairman and
Council. Consultants are then sought (sometimes in-house) to carry out the
projects under the direction of one of the six ACUS committees.26 These
consultants, who have numbered in excess of 300 over the life of the Conference, are a veritable “Who’s Who” of administrative law scholars.27 They
produce reports with proposed recommendations that are vetted by the
relevant committees and then voted on by the Conference as a whole. The
discussions in committee and at the plenary session are conducted pursuant
28
to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which ensures two things: (1)
that the public is informed of (and by our practice often participates in) the
21.
When President Obama named ten members of the Council on July 8, 2010, he
said, “ACUS is a public-private partnership designed to make government work better . . . .”
President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 8, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-more-keyadministration-posts-7810.
22.
The public members receive travel and per diem payments for the meetings they
attend. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 26 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/
2011/02/ACUS-2012-Cong-Budget.pdf. The donated value of their time, however, if estimated by hourly rates, amounts to an annual contribution to the government of over half of
the Conference’s overall budget.
23.
See SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCIAL & ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., INTERIM REP. ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCESS AND
PROCEDURE PROJECT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Comm. Print 2006).
24.
Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice to
Michael A. Fitzpatrick, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Aug. 18, 2009)
(on file with ACUS) (setting forth potential projects for the re-initiated ACUS).
25.
For example, the members met in breakout sessions during the December 2010
plenary to propose new projects for the Conference. See Administrative Conference of the
United States, 53rd Plenary Session, ACUS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/
uploads/downloads/2011/01/Plenary-Transcript-53rd-Session.pdf (transcript of conference).
Agencies also request assistance from ACUS for specific projects and workshops throughout
the year.
26.
See, e.g., Congressional Review Act RFP, ACUS (May 20, 2011), http://www.
acus.gov/resources/congressional-review-act-rfp/ (soliciting proposals from potential consultants). The six ACUS committees are the Committee on Adjudication, the Committee on
Administration and Management, the Committee on Collaborative Governance, the Committee on Judicial Review, the Committee on Regulation, and the Committee on
Rulemaking. The Committees, ACUS, http://www.acus.gov/about/the-committees/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2011).
27.
A list of consultants has been compiled by Scott Rafferty, Deputy Director of
Research and Policy, and will soon appear on the ACUS website.
28.
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2006).
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deliberations; and (2) that resulting recommendations are the work of the
committees and the Assembly, not just the consultants or the staff.
29
ACUS was revived in 2010 after fifteen years of darkness.30 It has
since held two plenary sessions, during which the members voted to adopt
five recommendations from ACUS-sponsored studies that reflect the empirical nature of our research. The first recommendation, Preemption of State
Law by Federal Agencies, deals with pressing issues of federalism that have
produced numerous Supreme Court decisions. It was supported by a study
performed by Professor Catherine M. Sharkey of New York University
School of Law. Professor Sharkey’s empirical work involved extensive
interviews with fifty people in federal and state government, and in-depth
case studies of the regulatory rulemaking records of six federal agencies.
31
There is little doubt that both the Recommendation (2010-1) and the
32
resulting scholarly article benefited enormously from access to key players
at agencies, and from the expert critiques provided by the government and
public members of the Rulemaking Committee.

29.
The Conference officially returned on March 3, 2010, when I was confirmed by
the U.S. Senate as Chairman. Administrative Conference of the United States—Paul R. Verkuil,
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/
111thCongressExecutiveNominations/AdminConfUS-PaulVerkuil.cfm (last visited Oct. 5,
2011). President Obama appointed the ten additional members of the Council in July 2010,
and it was fully staffed shortly thereafter. See Peter Orszag, ACUS is Back, OMBLOG (Jul. 9,
2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/07/09/ACUS-is-Back. The 53rd
Plenary Session was held in December 2010, and the 54th in June 2011. The Administrative
Conference of the United States—2010 Plenary Session, COMMERCE.GOV (Dec. 13, 2010, 8:18
PM), http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/developments/administrative-conference-united-states2010-plenary-session.
30.
Orszag, supra note 29. Why the Conference was defunded in 1995 is a complicated
question of legislative priorities, political shifts in power, and dissatisfaction with some
recommendations. See generally Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19 (1998). The entire first
issue of Volume 30 of the Arizona State Law Journal is devoted to discussing the demise and
possible revival of ACUS.
The defunding of ACUS was seen as a mistake from the start, and many influential
figures worked for its revival. The two most important voices were Justices Stephen G.
Breyer and Antonin G. Scalia, the latter a former Conference member and Chairman.
Administrative Conference of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14-30 (2010) (statements of Justice
Breyer and Justice Scalia). On August 1, 2011, right after the debt ceiling vote, the House
voted 382 to 23 to reauthorize ACUS through 2014. Bill Summary & Status—112th Congress
(2011-2012)—H.R. 2480—All Information, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d112:HR02480:@@@L&summ2=m&# (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). This is
quite a bipartisan endorsement.
31.
Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law, Recommendation
2010-1, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).
32.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012).
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Professor Steven Balla of the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and
Public Administration at The George Washington University was the consultant on the Rulemaking Comments project, which became
33
Recommendation 2011-2. Rulemaking has long been an interest of the
Conference, and the advent of new technology and social media make it a
subject ripe for review. Professor Balla analyzed numerous rulemakings
between 2008 and 2011 where there were reply comments from the public
to agencies utilizing regulations.gov, which posts information on 123 government agencies. He sampled comments, then did extensive interviews
and follow-up. In this case as well, ACUS connections made this empirical
work possible.
Perhaps the most extensive empirical study since ACUS’s revival was
conducted for the Government Contractor Ethics project by Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington University School of Law. Government
contractor ethics has become a subject of intense interest during the last
two administrations because contractors, both military and civilian, have
grown exponentially relative to full-time government employees.34 Professor Clark’s research involved over ninety initial and follow-up interviews
with government and private sector personnel, and extensive meetings with
officials at the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and the Department of Defense. In addition, since
contractor ethics rules are of intense interest to the private sector, meetings
were held by our staff and Professor Clark with appropriate business interests and the public interest community. The resulting study35 and
36
Recommendation 2011-3 are deeply supported by this empirical process.
Finally, experiential learning was at the heart of the Agency Use of Video
37
Hearings project done in-house by attorney-advisor Funmi Olorunnipa.
33.
Rulemaking Comments, Recommendation 2011-2, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9,
2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/06/CORFINAL-Rulemaking-Comments-Recommendation.pdf.
34.
See, e.g., Paul C. Light, The New True Size of Government (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Pub.
Serv. Organizational Performance Initiative, Research Brief No. 2, 2006), available at http://
wagner.nyu.edu/performance/files/True_Size.pdf.
35.
Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest In and Out of Government (Wash.
Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02-03,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785520##.
36.
Compliance Standards for Government Contractor Employees—Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9,
2011).
37.
See FUNMI E. OLORUNNIPA, AGENCY USE OF VIDEO HEARINGS: BEST
PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION 3 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/05/Revised-Final-Draft-Report-on-Agency-Use-of-VideoHearings-5-10-11.pdf (examining the experience of agencies that have already used video
hearing technology and identifying potential uses of the technology by other agencies with
high-volume caseloads).
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This project involved demonstrations of new video hearing technology in
the Social Security Administration’s disability hearing process, which led
38
to a “best practices” recommendation, Recommendation (2011-4), for
expanding the use of such technology to other high-volume caseload agencies like the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Executive Office for
Immigration Review at the Department of Justice. Understanding the
technology behind video hearings, and the opportunities it offers agencies
for fair and efficient decision making, has the potential to transform government adjudications, while saving hundreds of millions of dollars, and
reducing the delays that members of the public face in having their claims
39
resolved.
These examples of ACUS studies and recommendations provide a
glimpse of how empirical research can make government procedures and
processes more fair, efficient, and effective.40 They are only the most recent
examples of a Conference commitment to understanding how agencies
work, and how to make them work better. From the beginning, Conference
studies have employed data collection and interviews as research techniques. In fact, the current Chairman, in an earlier life as a consultant to
ACUS, contributed an empirical study that looked into how the informal
41
adjudicative processes of forty-two agencies actually worked.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This new journal connects fields that are sometimes viewed as separate
42
enterprises. But, in many ways, environmental law is administrative law.
Through its recommendation and research efforts, ACUS has at least
viewed the fields as first cousins, if not siblings. It is appropriate to
reemphasize these connections in this inaugural issue.
38.
Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and Possibilities for Expansion, 76
Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011).
39.
In the immigration setting, the lengthy queues mean that those seeking asylum
can be kept in detention for years before their cases can be heard. Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson,
Fearing the United States: Rethinking Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
589, 590 (2007).
40.
The fifth recommendation, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, supported by
an in-house study prepared by Bridget Dooling, a detailee from OIRA, has by its very
nature less of an empirical bent. Still, it involved extensive interviews with agency general
counsels and legal staff. Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,789 (Aug. 9,
2011).
41.
See Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
739 (1976) (describing how many of the “procedural ingredients” required by Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), were actually present in a broad set of agency adjudications).
42.
This assumes, of course, that the substantive and procedural limits that apply to
the APA and ACUS also apply to the work of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
See supra note 7.
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When the organizing mechanism of administrative law, the APA, was
enacted in 1946, the field of administrative law was characterized by the
work of the independent agencies, and adjudicatory decision making was
44
the norm. This structure remained largely in place through the 1960s,
when, because of its procedural advantages, rulemaking soon became the
45
most significant aspect of agency practice.
With the advent of EPA in 1970, the focus of administrative law shifted
46
dramatically. In some ways, the shift had occurred even earlier in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, which found an agency duty to
consider “aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects of power devel47
opment” in the Federal Power Act. This judicial expansion of regulatory
responsibilities inspired the creation of EPA and gave environmental law
48
enormous influence over the APA’s standing to sue requirements.
The creation of EPA was also an organizational milestone for government. Administrative law has always been concerned with the allocation of
powers among the branches and the role of independent and executive
49
agencies. In 1970, President Nixon created the Ash Council under con50
gressionally-granted reorganization powers. The Council focused on the
formation of EPA, which required the transfer of agency functions from
numerous departments, and it debated the kind of agency that should be
created to house these powers. The three choices were to place EPA within
an existing department, to set it up as a free-standing executive agency, or
to create it as an independent commission. Despite congressional desire for
43.
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
44.
Perhaps the most widely studied agency in those days was the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which employed large numbers of “hearing examiners” (now
administrative law judges) and utilized the formal adjudication provisions of the APA. See,
e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (discussing,
in part, the use and meaning of the substantial evidence test under the National Labor
Relations Act and the APA and the decision-making role of hearing examiners).
45.
See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (holding that
rules can be used to reduce issues in adjudications).
46.
In addition, 1970 was the year the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct)
became law, putting workplace safety at the center of the labor/management agenda. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
47.
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F. 2d 608, 616 (2d.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
48.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (recognizing that, in addition
to economic harms, non-economic harms like aesthetic and environmental harms can lay the
basis for standing under the APA). See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4.2 (5th ed. 2008).
49.
See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
50.
The Council (formally known as the President’s Advisory Council on Reorganization) was created under the direction of Roy Ash, hence the Ash Council.
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51

an independent commission, President Nixon decided by Executive Order,
52
pursuant to reorganization authority, to create EPA as an independent
agency in the Executive Branch,53 thereby transforming the regulatory
landscape with a stroke of the Executive pen. The swiftness of that move
seems unthinkable today. For example, more than a year after its creation,
54
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) remains without a
confirmed director due to congressional challenges for, among other things,
55
its not having been established as an independent agency.
The appointment and confirmation process has also changed dramatically from what it was in 1970. President Nixon named William
Ruckelshaus to be the first head of EPA, and he was confirmed two days
56
after its creation was announced. President Obama is still negotiating
with Congress to get the head of the CFPB confirmed. Moreover, reorganization power, which Congress granted to President Bush when he
established the Department of Homeland Security in 2002,57 has now
expired. President Obama must approach Congress for new reorganization
authority if he wants to reorganize agencies like the Department of Commerce to focus on international trade and competiveness, for example.
An emphasis on EPA’s regulatory scope came as a consequence of the
deregulation movement of the 1970s. In discrediting economic regulation,
that movement ushered environmental and safety regulation to the center

51.
See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008) (describing congressional responses to creation of EPA).
52.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970) (providing
the initial organization of EPA).
53.
An “independent agency in the Executive Branch” means a free-standing agency
rather than an executive department, like Health and Human Services. It is in contrast to
“independent agencies,” which are run by commissioners who enjoy for-cause removal
protections. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT: EVOLUTION AND TRENDS 31-38 (Comm. Print 1980) (describing different forms of government entities).
54.
The CFPB was a result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–2113 (2010).
55.
The Consumer Bankers Association recently said: “We would prefer to see the
bureau run by a commission . . . [like] the Consumer Product Safety Commission . . . .” Ben
Protess, Choice to Lead Consumer Bureau Shows an Aggressive Streak, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011,
at B5. The Senate and House members who support this view are holding up the confirmation process. Their views reflect a long tradition of the party not in the White House
preferring independent commissions to executive organizations. See Devins & Lewis, supra
note 51, at 472–75.
56.
Ruckelshaus was confirmed as Administrator of EPA on December 2, 1970, and
sworn in on December 4, 1970. EPA, THE GUARDIAN: ORIGINS OF THE EPA (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/origins.html.
57.
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2243.
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stage of administrative decision making. By abolishing agencies such as
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and limiting the regulatory missions of agencies like the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the burden of agency policy making shifted from
rate setting to regulation of social (or external) costs at EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Since these agencies
are inevitably engaged in a policy-driven process, their decisions remain
controversial and political. Not surprisingly, the most cited case in the
59
federal courts, Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, involved policy choices made
61
by EPA.60 The Chevron “domain” dominates administrative law courses,
62
and EPA regularly produces major Supreme Court opinions. If one
measures an agency’s significance to administrative law by citation count,
EPA is the clear winner. And even if one only counts the number of appel63
late decisions involving an agency, EPA ranks very high.
Moreover, another staple of administrative law courses, the OIRA
regulatory review process, might not exist without the need to review rules
produced by EPA and OSHA. The 1970s precursor to OIRA, President
Nixon’s Quality of Life Review, was created largely to review EPA and
64
OSHA rules.
Another way to measure the significance of EPA’s effect on administrative law is to look at the work of ACUS. The Appendix lists the twenty-six
environmental projects pursued by the Conference from 1971 to 1995.65 No
agency’s activities have occupied the Conference as much as EPA’s, except
58.
See DAVID BOIES & PAUL R. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 558–617
(1977) (emphasizing the shift from economic to social-cost regulation).
59.
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (exhibiting deferral to EPA’s policy expertise under the Clean
Air Act).
60.
Similarly, OSHA’s workplace safety mission led one Justice to call for a revival of
the non-delegation doctrine. See Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
61.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833 (2001).
62.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that EPA had
statutory power under the Clean Air Act to address global climate change).
63.
If immigration appeals are set aside, EPA produced over ten percent of administrative agency cases in the courts of appeal in FY 2010. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS—2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE
DIRECTOR
96
(2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/judicialbusinespdfversion.pdf.
64.
See James Tozzi, Advisory Bd., Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Address at the
30th Anniversary of OIRA Event at George Washington University: OIRA’s Formative
Years (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20110523_OIRA_GWU_2.pdf.
65.
See infra app. If the projects led to recommendations, these projects will soon be
available on the ACUS website and the recommendations will be republished in the Federal
Register. If the projects only produced reports, they will be available on Hein Online at a
future date.
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perhaps the Social Security disability program, whose process requirements
66
continue to demand attention. It is very likely that the reborn Conference
will continue to keep EPA and environmental law high on its agenda.67

CONCLUSION
New ventures are stimulating and creative, as I am sure the editors feel
about this first issue. I have a little of that feeling myself after restarting
ACUS from scratch, a process that included finding space, ordering furniture and computers, and, most significantly, hiring staff. We have a
wonderful esprit at ACUS, in large measure because everyone chose to join
this exciting new venture. They are proud of ACUS and its deep tradition
of empirical study of administrative law.
I wish the Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law a
long and productive life, much like the Conference has had, but without the
fifteen-year gap from which we are just emerging.

66.
See OLORUNNIPA, supra note 37.
67.
The recent ACUS recommendations on rulemaking received extensive comments
from representatives of EPA during the committee process. See Legal Considerations in
e-Rulemaking, supra note 40; Rulemaking Comments, supra note 33.
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APPENDIX
ACUS STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Year
1971

Author/Consultant

Subject

Related
Recommendation

Stolz

NEPA Study

–

1971

Flannery

Land Use Decisions and the Environment:
the BLM

–

1971

Smith

Bureau of Reclamation Environmental
Decisionmaking

–

1972 Cramton-Berg

Enforcing the National Environmental
Policy Act in Federal Agencies

–

1972 Cramton-Boyer

Citizens Suits in the Environmental Field:
Peril or Promise?

–

1973

Cramton-Berg

On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and
the Federal Bureaucracy

–

1973

Reeves

FAA Recommendations Implementing
NEPA

–

1973

Hines-Nathanson

Establishing an Environmental Court

–

1973

Murphy

Procedures for Resolution of Environmental
Issues in Licensing Proceedings

73-6

1974

Shaw

Procedures to Ensure Compliance by Federal
Facilities With Environmental Quality
Standards

75-4

1976

Currie

Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Act and
Federal Water Pollution Control Act

76-4

1979 Baram

Regulation of Health, Safety and
Environmental Quality and the Use of CostBenefit Analysis

79-4

1982 Merrill

Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing
Chemicals

82-5

1984 Ogden

Public Regulation of Siting of Industrial
Development Projects

84-1

1984 Anderson

Negotiation and Informal Agency Action:
The Case of Superfund

84-4

1985 Boyer-Meidinger

Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits
under Federal Environmental Laws

85-3

1990 Baram

Risk Communication by Regulatory
Agencies in Protecting Health, Safety, and
the Environment

90-3

1990 Elliott et al.

Providing Economic Incentives in
Environmental Regulation

1992 Shapiro

The Dormant Noise Control Act and
Options to Abate Noise Pollution

1992 Kornhauser-Revesz De Minimis Settlements Under Superfund

–
92-6
92-9

Year
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Author/Consultant

Subject

Related
Recommendation

An Administrative Alternative to Tort
Litigation to Resolve Asbestos Claims

–

1992 Schatz

Environmental Regulation in the Antarctic

–

1993 Hornstein

Regulating Pesticides: FIFRA Registration,
Reregistration, Suspension, and Cancellation
Procedures

93-5

1994 Yaffee-Wondolleck

Negotiating Survival: An Assessment of the
Potential Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution Techniques for Resolving
Conflicts Between Endangered Species and
Development

–

1995 Kerwin-Langbein

An Evaluation of Negotiated Rulemaking at
the Environmental Protection Agency

–

1995 Healy

An Evaluation of the Fairness and
Effectiveness of the Judicial Review
Preclusion Provision in the Superfund
Statute

–

1992 Brickman et al.
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